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Abstract 
Religions play a significant role in Italian cities and, more generally, in the social, cultural and 
political lives of Italians. Since 1948, the Italian state has formally been secular, and it guarantees 
religious freedoms beyond Christianity. However, the reality is much more complex, as the 
hegemonic position of Catholicism is still evident, and religious minorities often deal with various 
forms of marginalization, stigmatization and lack of resources. This phenomenon is visible in 
Italian cities, particularly by looking at the evolving role of Catholic spaces such as parishes, and 
the parallel struggles for legitimation, visibility and resources of religious minorities. In this 
scenario, Italy seems to be increasingly characterized by various and uneven forms of inter-faith 
competition, which also imply rivalry in the spheres of charity, voluntarism and the provision of 
social services. This paper analyses the relations between religious groups and the Italian state, 
proposing the idea of a ‘politics of camouflage’ shaping inter-faith competition for resources and 
legitimation. 
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1. Introduction 
It is well known that religion is a powerful force in the production and organization of urban 
space, and investigations into the politics, cultures and spatialities of faith have not been rare in 
the social sciences, particularly over the last decade (e.g., Becci, Burchardt, & Casanova, 2013; 
Holloway & Valins, 2002; Hopkins, Long, & Olson, 2013; Kong, 2010; Yorgason & della Dora, 
2009). In this field, many scholars have emphasized how religion is becoming an ’urban way of 
life’ and the complex coexistence of gods, religions and beliefs in the city (Coleman & Maier, 
2013; Dwyer, 2016; Dwyer, Gilbert, & Shah, 2013; Garbin, 2012; Orsi, 1999). Ideas of cities as 
post-secular were suggested (Beaumont, 2018; Beaumont & Baker, 2011; Burchardt, Wohlrab-
Sahr, & Middell, 2015; Cloke & Beaumont, 2013; Tse, 2014) and, in the frame of multiple 
secularities following Vertovec (2010), the concept of ‘religious super-diversity’ was employed 
as a way of accounting for the plethora of religious innovations in cities (Becci, Burchardt, & 
Giorda, 2017). 
The role of religion in shaping cities is quite evident in the case of Italy, where the presence of 
Catholicism is palpable, not only in the materiality of the built environment but also in its rituals, 
traditions, cultural habits and social structures (Ventura, 2013). There are no official (census) 
statistics about the diffusion of religions in Italy, but, according to recent investigations, about 
80% of the population declares itself to be Catholic, and half of the population actually practises 
rituals on a regular basis.1 People belonging to non-Catholic religious communities constitute 
between 7.0% and 10.5% of the population; the most numerous groups are Muslims, Orthodox, 
Protestants and Buddhists (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Estimated sizes of the main religious minorities in Italy 
 Italian citizens Migrants without 
Italian citizenship 
Quota of Italian 
population (citizens 
and non-citizens) 
Muslim 405,300 1,682,600 3,46 % 
Orthodox 306,700 1,523,300 3,03 % 
Protestant 466,400 224,400 1,14 % 
     (of which: Waldesian) 30,000 Not available 0,05 % 
Jehovah’s Witnesses 425,000 Not available 0,70 % 
Buddhist 186,600 117,200 0,50 % 
Hinduist 45,200 152,500 0,33 % 
Sikh 
Jewish 
20,000 
36,500 
50,000 
4,600 
0,12% 
0,07 % 
Mormon  27,500 Not available 0,05 % 
 
Note: No accurate surveys on the distribution of religions exist in Italy, as the Italian census does not survey individual 
creeds. Data are indirect and obtained by considering the distribution of a certain religion in the countries of origin 
of migrants. As a consequence, they refer to people from Islamic countries, or from countries where there is a 
significant presence of Muslims. For a full discussion on the limits of data and sources, see Chiodelli (2015). 
Sources: https://cesnur.com; www.dossierimmigrazione.it; www.chiesavaldese.org; www.ismu.org (last accessed 7 
June 2019). 
  
                                                          
1 The study entitled ‘LAST’ and published in June 2018 is available at http://www.communitymediaresearch.it (last 
accessed 7 June 2019). The practice of ‘regular’ religious rituals corresponds to attending a church mass at least 
once per month. 
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This paper explores one particular aspect of the coexistence of different religions in Italian cities, 
that is, their strategies for legitimating and reproducing their presence by using space, providing 
services and attracting resources. It argues that religious institutions develop different strategies 
in order to attract private and public funds, for example, by branding and advertising their 
philanthropic and charity activities to local populations. The uneven distribution of resources 
and powers among religious communities ultimately produces a hierarchical structure, where 
Catholic religion maintains a hegemonic role both in terms of its presence in Italian cities, 
particularly in the provision and regulation of welfare services, and in terms of charity activities, 
both formally and informally. Specifically, the paper suggests that strategies develop in the 
framework of a ‘politics of camouflage’: the representation of religious institutions as key actors 
in the provision of welfare services and in the promotion of social cohesion conceals the 
entrepreneurial and competitive dimensions of a scenario characterized by the coexistence of 
religious groups struggling for their reproduction in cities. 
The mobilization of the concept of camouflage has been inspired by the work of Leach (2006), 
who proposes a theory of camouflage in order to explore the roles of aesthetics, representations 
and simulations in society, with a focus on architecture. In his work, camouflage is not intended 
within the narrow conventional sense of avoiding detection, as in the case of military 
camouflage, but with a broad sense of representation and self-representation that is always at 
work within culture. For example, in the case of military camouflage, it is meaningful that the 
fashion industry appropriated camouflage combat clothing. Camouflage is intended as a form of 
masquerade and a mode of representation that operates through several forms, including art, 
architecture, politics and even urban planning. It is considered to be a mechanism for inscribing 
an object, a subject or a phenomenon in a given cultural setting, and to connect it with other 
cultural elements. Hence, camouflage is not just about concealment against a given background; 
it refers to both revealing and concealing and delineates a spectrum of degrees of definition of 
the self against a cultural ‘background’. It may respond to both a strategy of ‘becoming part’ of, 
or rather a ‘distinction’ from a background, and in this sense the politics of camouflage also has 
to do with the aesthetic of belonging to a postor multi-secular society where traditional 
structures of belonging and citizenship, such as nationalism and religious devotion, seem to 
break down more and more (e.g., Baubock, 2003; Bauman, 2000; Burchardt, Wohlrab-Sahr, & 
Middell, 2015; Purcell, 2003; Secor, 2003; Staeheli, 2003). 
The idea of exploring the relationships taking form in the interplay between religious identities, 
urban spaces, aesthetics, economy and politics is not new in urban studies. For example, Gale 
(2008) mobilized the case of Manchester in order to explore intersections between urban 
planning, architecture and religious diversity; Ruez (2012) explored the aesthetic regimes and 
spatial coordinates that animated public debate about the Park 51 Islamic community centre in 
Manhattan; through a series of ethnographic works, Kuppinger (2014) analysed the production 
of Islamic topographies and cityscapes in German cities; Bugg (2012) focused on religious 
minorities and the production of space in marginal areas of Sydney; while Klingorová and 
Gökarıksel (2018) discussed how bodies and everyday performances may produce sacred space 
and spatial regimes that govern daily life in Czech cities. Overall, this rich body of literature 
emphasizes the crucial role of urban space in the production, experience and performance of 
religion (and secularity) on different geographical scales, from the body to the national and the 
global. Issues of visibility and aesthetics play crucial roles in shaping conflicts and strategies in 
cities, and planning operates in this delicate terrain. Camouflage is intended here as a potential 
outcome and strategy in the relationship between religion and the city: by shaping the 
boundaries between visibility and invisibility (what Rancière, 2000, famously named ‘the 
partition of the sensible’; see also Brighenti, 2010), and by moulding perceived presences and 
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absences of subjects, groups, spaces, problems, resources, struggles and moralities, religious 
groups enact different strategies for ‘being’ in the city. 
By focusing on Catholicism and three Italian religious minority groups, this paper argues that 
inter-faith competition (and exclusion from competition for some groups) in the access to 
resources (space, power, money, visibility, credibility and legitimation) develops through forms 
of camouflage, concealing conflicts, rivalry, exclusion, antagonism and opposition between 
religious communities, in order to celebrate positive dimensions regarding morality, social 
activism, care and inclusivity in contemporary Italian cities. With this aim in mind, the paper also 
contributes to the existing literature by tracing the boundaries of the relationships between 
religions and politics in Italy. This is a complex, conflictual and evolving relationship, particularly 
in the framework of growing diversity characterizing Italian cities (Allievi, 2014; Schmoll & Semi, 
2013). 
The analysis is based on a mixture of different sources. First, Italian official documents have been 
consulted in order to trace the historical evolution of the state’s regulation of religious 
communities: these include the Agreements (Intese) regulating relationships between the Italian 
state and religious groups, as well as specific laws. Second, the literature on religions, space and 
planning in Italy has been explored: articles written since 1990 (the year of the reform of the 
system for financing religious groups, which will be discussed here) have been collected through 
keyword searches in Google Scholar.2 The literature is mostly in Italian,3 and it has been 
published mainly in journals in the spheres of legal studies (first of all, the rich depository of the 
international journal Stato e Chiese) and religious studies (Religioni e Società, Studi e Materiali 
di Storia delle Religioni, and the website Cesnur4). Third, data and statistics have been collected 
from both official Italian sources (i.e., Istat) and key organizations of the third sector (particularly 
Caritas). Fourth, promotional websites proposed by the religious groups were explored in 
November 2018, and promotional images were collected when available. Finally, the paper took 
advantage of fieldwork exploration, including a vast number of interviews and informal 
discussions with religious actors, obtained through years of relations, within and beyond the 
academy, of one of the authors. It has to be stressed that both authors – formally, a male 
geographer and a female historian of religions working in Turin and Rome, respectively – are 
white, Italian academics without any formal association to any religious groups (we both 
consider ourselves atheists). Thanks to long-term relationships based on trust and mutual 
knowledge, it has been possible to discuss, gather information and explore research questions 
with Italian religious leaders through unstructured interviews, discussions and email exchanges 
which developed from May to November 2018. Specifically, we have had specific discussions – 
about the positions of religious minorities in Italian society, their problems and struggles, and 
their relations with other religious groups – with local and national leaders of two communities 
(Waldensian and Romanian Orthodox) with whom we have had contacts already due to our 
previous researches, which have permitted a solid and mutual connection with the Interfaith 
Committee based in Turin since 2006.5 As far as the Islamic community is concerned, we have 
been taking part in the Italian Islam Forum since 2016, and we have had several informal talks 
with the imam and the leaders of mosques in both Turin and Rome. 
                                                          
2 We have used the keywords ‘pianificazione’, ‘finanziamento’, ‘religione’, ‘città’ and ‘urbanistica’ (i.e., planning, 
financing, religion, city and urban studies) 
3 There are, of course, meaningful exceptions: meaningful contributions in the English language include, for 
example, those of Pollard (2008), Chiodelli (2015) and Garelli (2016). 
4 See http://cesnur.org (last accessed 7 June 2019). 
5 See http://www.interculturatorino.it/wp-content/uploads/Testo-della-carta-dei-valori.pdf (last accessed 7 June 
2019). 
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In order to develop our argument, the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes 
the evolving relationship between religious groups and urban policies in Italy, particularly by 
focusing on the regulation of religious spaces and the distribution of public resources. The paper 
then focuses on Catholic religious spaces as providers of social and personal services, particularly 
by proposing the example of oratories. The following section explores religious spaces of 
minority religions, their struggles for visibility and resources, and their ambiguous position in 
the social, cultural and political spheres. The core argument is then developed by exploring the 
politics of camouflage in inter-faith urban relations; while the concluding section summarizes 
the core ideas proposed and suggests the idea that competition (and exclusion from 
competition) between religions in Italian cities takes its form through a kind of uneven 
camouflage. 
 
 
2. Regulating religious diversity 
As anticipated, according to various scholars, Italy has been historically characterized by 
religious diversity, which further increased in recent years due to immigration and cultural 
globalization (Naso & Salvarani, 2012; Ventura, 2014). Catholicism is widely perceived as a core 
element of Italy’s collective identity. For example, politics and public discourses often mirror 
Catholic beliefs and ethics, and it is not rare that political decision-makers manifest themselves 
to be influenced by their religious commitments (Giorgi, 2018; Pace, 2013). 
From a juridical point of view, the legal status of Catholicism is fully regulated by a series of 
agreements between the Catholic Church and Italian Kingdom, which are called the Lateran 
Pacts. The agreements were introduced in 1929 and they recognized the Vatican City as an 
independent state, and the Italian state agreed to give the Roman Catholic Church financial 
compensation for the loss of the Papal States, settling the so-called ‘Roman question’. The pacts 
were composed of two parts: a political treaty recognizing the full sovereignty of the Holy See 
in the State of Vatican City; and a Concordat regulating relations between the Catholic Church 
and Italy. 
Although the Italian Constitution of 1948 declares that relations between the Italian state and 
the Catholic Church are regulated by the Lateran Pacts, it no longer mentions Catholicism as the 
state religion, as it was in the past. Therefore, the Churches and the state have to be considered 
as distinct. domains. Still, the Catholic Church maintained a privileged relationship with the 
state. One of the most evident points of this privilege is the fact that the Catholic Church was 
economically supported by Italian public money up to 1985. In the framework of a review of the 
Concordat, the Italian state introduced modifications and technical clarifications in 1984, 
explicitly stressing that the Catholic Church’s position as the only state-supported religion in Italy 
was to be ended. With this purpose in mind, the Italian state replaced the state financing with a 
personal income tax called the ‘otto per mille’ (8x1000) to which other religious groups have 
access; this will be further analysed in this paper. 
Concerning ‘other’ religions, Art. no. 8 of the Italian Constitution mentions the possibility of 
developing specific agreements, named Intese, between the state and a group of 34 religions 
classified as ‘allowed cults’ (culti ammessi, a formula used in the Lateran Pacts).6 Currently, the 
                                                          
6 For the complete list, see http://www.libertaciviliimmigrazione.dlci.interno.gov.it/it/enti-culto-diversi-dalcattolico-
dotati-personalita-giuridica-disciplinati-dalla-legge-11591929 (last accessed 7 June 2019). The number of cults has 
increased with time and will probably keep growing in future. 
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Italian state formally recognizes via Intesa 12 religions.7 The other religions and spiritual 
practices which are not formally recognized by the state do not have a juridical status, and they 
can only be technically considered as cultural associations (Ventura, 2013). This is the case of 
well-known religions such as Islam: Islam is not legally considered a religion in Italy as Islam does 
not have a specific agreement (Intesa) with the Italian state; only the Centro Islamico Culturale 
d’Italia (the Mosque of Rome) is recognized as a ‘culto ammesso’ (allowed cult), having a juridical 
personality. In relation to this phenomenon, there are no formal mosques in the country, and 
several Muslim cultural associations are hosted in a variety of buildings with different formal 
functions, such as warehouses, often named ‘prayer halls’. However, in this paper, in the interest 
of simplicity, we will just use the term ‘mosque’ to indicate Islamic places of worship in general. 
There are currently about 850 informal mosques in the country, which is a small number, in 
absolute terms, when compared with the approximately 65,000 Christian churches throughout 
the country (Angelucci, Bombardieri, & Tacchini, 2014).8 A further layer of complexity is added 
by the fact that many rules, for example, those concerning permissions for building and running 
places of worship, are defined by regional and local governments, producing heterogeneous 
situations. In the case of Catholic buildings, it also has to be mentioned that most Italian 
churches are owned by different institutions belonging to the Italian Catholic Church (formally 
known as CEI, which is the acronym for Conferenza Episcopale Italiana), but in some cases they 
belong to the Italian state and are managed by religious institutions. In the case of other 
religions, they belong to a variety of different subjects and institutions, including private 
subjects. 
The uneven legal status of religions is mirrored by the unequal presence, visibility and 
distribution of religious spaces. In the case of Catholic buildings, distinct spatial patterns for 
cities and rural spaces were formed over the last century. Churches (parrocchie) are regularly 
distributed in cities, forming a dense, multipolar network of institutions and activities. Outside 
cities, churches are marginal elements, as convents and monasteries have been – and still are – 
the main spaces for religious aggregation and religious practices. They are spatially dispersed, 
without specific patterns and without regular connections between them.9 
The regular distribution of churches in Italian cities was defined by law: according to a 1964 rule, 
‘religious spaces’ have to be considered as urban infrastructures, and they have to be located 
evenly in order to serve an average population of 5000–10,000 inhabitants.10 The law mentions 
religious spaces, but de facto it has been applied uniquely with reference to Catholic buildings. 
Specific regional and local laws regulated further details for the distribution and management 
of religious spaces and services, such as the running of a limited number of Catholic cemeteries. 
Today, the distribution of religious spaces is challenged by a variety of ‘other’ churches and 
religious places which are becoming more present in Italian cities. The rules that were originally 
written for Catholics have been progressively extended to other religious and permitted cults, 
                                                          
7 For the full list, with legal details, see www.governo.it/Presidenza/USRI/confessioni/intese_indice.html#2 (last 
accessed 7 June 2019). 
8 This is an approximate number as there are no official statistics; other authors, such as Chiodelli (2015), mention 
the presence of about 1000 mosques. Moreover, the number is not so high in relative terms, that is, when 
compared with the presence of the Islamic population in Italy: as a rough calculation (to be intended just as a proxy 
of the visibility of religious spaces), there is on average one mosque for every 2450 Islamic people and one church 
for every 738 Catholics. However, as suggested by Angelucci et al. (2014), the problem of Italian mosques is mostly 
related to the low quality of the buildings rather than to the mere quantity. 
9 Monasteries have been often imagined as autonomous ‘islands’ of spirituality insulated from the rest of the world; 
of course, in reality they interact meaningfully with local populations (Giorda & Hejazi, 2014). 
10 Law n. 847, 29 September 1964, and Ministerial Decree n. 1444, 1968. An average size of 2 m2 per inhabitant has 
to be destined for various kinds of religious, social and cultural infrastructure. 
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hence camouflaging inequality, but the reality is far from even or clear, as testified by the 
abundance of informal religious spaces which develop out of rules and formal recognition by the 
state (Chiodelli & Moroni, 2017; Marchei, 2014). 
Concerning taxes and fiscal regulation, the Italian constitution, Art. no. 20, following the 
indications of the 1929 Pacts, allows preferential treatment for religious institutions, as well as 
charity and philanthropic institutions more in general. In other words, religions explicitly and 
juridically recognized by the Italian state have a special treatment in order to organize and 
provide services related to social assistance, medical activities, charity, education, sports, arts 
and cultural activities. The main tool is a financing system popularly known as ‘otto per mille’ 
(8x1000), which was originally defined by Italian Law 222/1985 and was then introduced in 1990. 
As mentioned, before the introduction of this system, the Italian state directly transferred 
money to the Christian Catholic Church, and not to other religious institutions. According to the 
new system, part of the money collected through taxes (technically 0.8%, or 8x1000, of the 
income of every Italian taxpayer through the taxation system called IRPEF) is destined for 
religious institutions. Every year, each Italian taxpayer may choose the religious institution that 
will receive the quota: the distribution for 2018 is presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 - Distribution of 8x1000 funds in 2018 
 
Recipient 
Number of 
expressed 
preferences 
Share of 
preferences 
over the total 
number of 
Italian tax-
payers (%) 
Share of 
preferences 
over the total 
amount of 
expressed 
preferences 
(%) 
Money 
transferred 
under the 
8x1000 
programme 
(thousand 
euro) 
Money 
transferred 
under the 
8x1000 
programme 
(%) 
Italian State (*) 2,493,431 6.12 14.03 175,632 14.28 
Catholic Church 14,437,694 35.46 81.21 1,005,390 81.09 
Adventist Christian 23,711 0.06 0.13 1,609 0.13 
Assemblies of God in Italy 40,496 0.1 0.23 1,254 0.1 
Waldesians 469,071 1.15 2.64 32,684 2.66 
Lutherans 64,882 0.16 0.36 4,457 0.36 
Jews 56,937 0.14 0.32 3,962 0.32 
Evangelical 
Christian Baptists 
14,166 0.03 0.08 990 0.08 
Apostolic Church   8,991 0.02 0.05 273 0.02 
Orthodox 25,475 0.06 0.14 1,733 0.14 
Buddhist 125,786 0.31 0.71 8,790 0.71 
Hinduist 16,981 0.04 0.1 1,238 0.1    
Total 17,777,621 44%(**) 100% 1,230,348 100% 
 
Notes: (*) Taxpayers may choose not to destiny their 8x1000 to any religious institution, but to the Italian state. 
Further details are provided later in the paper. (**) This means that just 44% of taxpayers indicated a destination for 
8x1000. Most people simply do not indicate anything, and hence they quotas are distributed according to expressed 
preferences. 
Source: Italian Ministry of Finances, 
https://www1.finanze.gov.it/finanze3/stat_8xMilleSerie/index.php?&req_classe=01 (last accessed 7 June 2019). 
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Although Mormons are eligible to receive money through the 8x1000 system – as they are 
formally recognized by the Italian state through a specific Intesa – they explicitly refused to 
receive money, and hence they do not appear in Table 2. As the Mormon’s Head of 
Communications explained (interview, 23 April 2019), they refused in order to maintain their 
independence, since economic subsistence has been very important through the history of 
Mormons, and members contribute to it with a regular offer which is considered sufficient for 
the activities of the Church. 
Religions that have not been formally recognized by the Italian state may adopt a similar system, 
smaller in size, called the 5x1000, which is open to every ‘socially relevant’ association in Italy, 
including, for example, non-profit cultural associations. While only 12 religious groups may 
benefit from 8x1000 funds, thousands of associations and organizations may potentially receive 
5x1000 funds. It has also to be mentioned that, while 8x1000 is basically the main way to transfer 
money from the Italian state to religious groups, in the case of the Catholic Church a large 
amount of money is transferred every year by paying Catholic religion teachers in public schools 
(Crupi, 2003). 
The mechanism for accessing 8x1000 and 5x1000 resources is clearly competitive, as it is a zero-
sum game. Money flowing to a religious group will simply not flow to others. Advertising 
campaigns target taxpayers in order to convince them to opt for one religious group rather than 
another. As shown in Table 2, the Catholic Church receives a huge share of funds. In 2018, about 
half of the Italian population did not indicate any preferential destination for their 8x1000 (they 
did not choose any specific religion), while 81% of the rest of the population assigned their funds 
to the Catholic Church.11 The quota of citizens who do not indicate a preferential religion is 
distributed according to the shares of expressed preferences and, in this way, more than 80% of 
the total amount of money flows every year to the Catholic Church, which means about €1 
million per year. Local funds, provided by city halls to religious institutions in order to maintain 
religious buildings, are assigned on a discretionary basis, often mirroring 8x1000 distributions. 
These technical mechanisms are crucial in defining a politics of religious camouflage: the 
Catholic Church receives a disproportionate amount of money if compared with other groups 
(ultimately contributing to the perception of Italy as a de facto Christian Catholic country), while 
non-Catholic religions widely complain about the lack of resources and the impossibility of 
maintaining their buildings or running activities (Botti, 2014). 
In this framework, running social activities is crucial for obtaining money. Basically, it is 
reasonable to think that taxpayers commit their 8x1000 and 5x1000 taxes to the religious group 
to which they belong, regardless of any advertising or any consideration of the way money will 
be used by a religious group. However, it is also reasonable to think that people may opt for a 
religious group that proves to be socially active in offering services to disadvantaged subjects, 
such as the poor, ill, unemployed, homeless or impaired; this is the case of the Waldesian Church 
which – as it will be discussed below – is small in size but able to attract a limited but meaningful 
share of funds (i.e., 2.66%, as shown in Table 2). In this scenario, the main discursive strategy 
enacted by Italian religious groups is to ‘secularize’ their representation of the way 8x1000 and 
5x1000 money will be used. As it will be further argued, this means supporting a narrative that 
suggests that money will not be used for religious or spiritual activities, or to pay members of 
the clergy but, rather, it will be used to help people by providing social and personal services in 
a charitable way. 
                                                          
11 For the official data, see http://www1.finanze.gov.it/finanze3/stat_8xMille (last accessed 7 June 2019). 
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This is the core of the politics of camouflage operated by Italian religious groups at the basis of 
access to public money. The more a religion proves to be entrepreneurial, supportive and 
socially active, the more it is likely to access economic resources. In this sense, the provision of 
urban services by religious groups and the visibility of religious-based social activities in the 
urban space become a strategic asset in the urban politics of religious groups. It also has to be 
stressed that, in a framework of shrinking public money, the Italian state is trying to ‘free’ and 
‘support’ the resources and energies of the civic society, or third sector, as much as possible. 
This has been recently done with a 2017 law (decreto legislativo 3/7/2017) that simplifies the 
rules for the provision of services – free and paid, but not run for profit – aimed at addressing 
social or personal situations of need and difficulty, including professional social services; these 
include interventions for social, personal and family emergencies, home care, and residential 
structures for socially marginalized subjects. Religious groups are subjected to these rules. 
 
 
3. Christian catholic provision of urban services 
Over the years, the Catholic doctrine has come closer to social issues: the expression ‘social 
doctrine’ was introduced explicitly by Pope Pius XII in 1941, in reference to man, labour and 
state, and it was further elaborated and linked to the idea of subsidiarity by John Paul II in the 
1991 Encyclical Centesimus Annus. Finally, the 2009 Encyclical Caritas in Veritate, by Benedict 
XVI (2009), sustained the principle of the common good, intended as the good of all human 
beings in relation to the three spheres of materiality, sociality and spirituality. 
The Christian Catholic doctrine takes form through the provision of secondary welfare activities 
(i.e., welfare beyond the state). These include running hospitals and health services 
(ambulances, blood banks, rehabilitation centres); hospices for elderly people; residences for 
people suffering from nervous disorders, abusing drugs or for minors; shelters for the poor; soup 
kitchens; dormitories; services for the distribution of primary goods, such as clothes; day centres 
for the disabled or for helping minors with homework.12 Those services are mostly run by local 
parishes, but they are also managed by other subjects, including various religious organizations 
such as monastic communities (Frati francescani), lay congregations, Catholic social and cultural 
associations. 
To give an example, there are 102 Catholic hospitals in Italy, with 17,099 beds; 132 rehabilitation 
facilities, with 6057 beds; about 1500 structures assisting the elderly, with 78,000 beds, and 
about 23 hospices for cancer patients, with 346 beds. About 70,000 health workers are 
employed on a regular basis, including about 8000 doctors. Figures are constantly growing: in 
the case of charity workers, as they were just 4000 in 1980 and 11,000 in 2000.13 
The services managed by Catholic institutions are not for the exclusive use of Catholics; they are 
open to everyone, precisely because they are conceived as directed to the common good of 
every human being. A good example of transversal and pluralistic service may be offered by 
                                                          
12 Data presented in this section are extracted from the 4th National Census of Social Welfare Services and the 1st 
Census of Catholic Health Structures, published in 2011; see http://www.caritasitaliana.it/materiali/40/ 
poverieopere_07102011/giordano_07102011.pdf (last accessed 7 June 2019) (see also Attolino, 2012). 
13 See https://salute.chiesacattolica.it and https://www.lastampa.it/2015/12/20/vaticaninsider/sanit-
cattolicameno-cliniche-pi-ospedali-da-campo-D2A46ymMwLbg69Tp56rzqK/pagina.html (last accessed 7 June 2019). 
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Catholic oratories. We use the term ‘oratory’14 as a shorthand translation of the Italian word 
‘oratorio’. These are places for gathering and amusement, for children and teenagers: here they 
can spend time in an educative environment where, for example, they can sing, practise sports, 
organize theatre performances, play and study (Milani, 2015). 
There are currently about 8000 oratories in the country. Most are located next to churches and 
are formally managed by local parishes (more than 90%, according to a recent survey: 
Pagnoncelli, 2017); however, there are also examples of oratories organized in secular places, 
particularly in the southern part of the country; some well-known examples are the Oratorio di 
San Filippo Neri, Salesiani di don Bosco, Figli della carità, Giuseppini del Murialdo and Figlie di 
Maria Ausiliatrice (Ramello, 2009). 
Originally, oratories were established as sacred places for divine public worship. There have 
been various examples of private oratories in the past, erected in private homes for only one 
family or a private individual; however, currently most oratories are public, being open on a 
regular basis to different kinds of users, particularly due to the influence of San Giovanni Bosco, 
a 19th-century priest working in Turin, who intended the oratory to be a social gathering place 
for young people, especially young workers (Caimi, 2006; Gambini, 2002; Mori, 2011). According 
to Italian law,15 oratories are associations for social activities, requiring formal registration and 
the acceptance of common rules by all their members. Members receive an association card, 
which they are supposed to carry with them in order to access the oratory. 
The oratory is a non-profit structure and most activities are free, in order to achieve social 
inclusion; any money required for taking part in social activities is intended as a basic 
contribution in order to cover costs, without generating any financial profit. Most work 
performed in oratories is provided on a voluntary and free basis. Users are economically 
heterogeneous as oratories are populated by children from wealthy families as well as from 
middle-class or poor households, ultimately producing a certain level of social integration among 
the little ones (Gambini, 2002). Users are also heterogeneous in terms of spiritual attitudes: 
some young people actively take part in Catholic religious rituals (Sunday Mass, sacraments), 
but most people do not (Garelli, 2016; Pagnoncelli, 2017). Some of the children take part in the 
religious activities proposed by the oratories because their parents believe that the parish and 
the oratory are healthy educational environments. Many children are brought to oratories by 
their parents simply for organizational needs, beyond any religious or spiritual preference, for 
example, because both parents work and there are no relatives who can take care of the children 
during the afternoons or in summertime (Mori, 2011). 
As a result, participation is not strictly confessional, but open to everybody. Formally, the games, 
discussions and activities proposed in oratories are supposed to be formative from a human 
point of view, beyond religious affiliation. However, this does not mean that oratories are 
secular spaces. In the words of a Catholic priest (interview, 1 October 2018), ‘by its nature, the 
oratory is a place of welcome and gathering, founded on values of civil coexistence and mutual 
respect going beyond religious values. Oratories today are explicitly open to foreigners’. The 
term ‘foreigner’ is used here in an ambiguous way in order to indicate those not belonging to an 
ethical and cultural Italian ideal type, an idea which basically essentializes the vision of 
                                                          
14 For canon law, “it is a place for the convenience of some community or group of the faithful […], who assemble 
there, but to which other members of the faithful may have access with the consent of the competent superior 
(Codice di Diritto Canonico, Can. 1223). 
15 Two state legislative decrees place the oratories within the integrated system of social interventions and services 
(Laws 328/2000 and 206/2003). Oratories are also regulated by regional laws that distinguish structure and purpose 
on a local basis. 
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Catholicism as the ‘natural’ religious affiliation for Italians, acting as a camouflage for processes 
of racialization for religious groups connected with international migrations (Sayad, 1999), as, 
for example, in the case of Muslims, which is discussed below. It is also meaningful to consider 
that data regarding the size of religious groups in Italy, as presented in Table 1, are often 
estimated on the basis of data pertaining to migration flows. The words of the priest above are 
therefore not surprising. Oratories organize sport, recreational and educational activities, and 
non-Catholic children and youngsters are free to skip religious activities. Still, oratories surely 
contribute to the proliferation and visibility of Catholicism in Italian daily life. 
The example of oratories is also useful to emphasize the undisputed and hegemonic role played 
by the Catholic Church in the field of social care, and the unclear boundaries between secular 
and spiritual activities suggested by the Church (Boni, 2006; Folliero, 2010). Oratories are legally 
and socially at the crossroads between, on the one hand, processes of construction of a civil 
economy, the principle of subsidiarity, community welfare and, on the other, camouflaged 
dynamics of discrimination, privileges and uneven competition among the religious institutions 
in Italy, for – as it will be argued – it is hard to detect analogous structures managed by non-
Catholic institutions (Zamagni & Bruni, 2015). 
 
 
4. Religious minorities and their social activities 
The activities of religious minorities are fairly differentiated, and they have diverse positions and 
strategies in the framework of competition for social entrepreneurialism. In order to draw a 
schematic picture of the situation, this short section will focus on three religious groups: 
Waldensians, Muslims and Orthodox Romanians. The three groups have been selected for 
different reasons: the Waldesians are the richest non-Catholic group in terms of funding (Table 
2); the Orthodox Romanians are the more numerous non-Catholic group lacking a specific 
agreement (Intesa); the Muslims are the biggest non-Christian community (both Catholics and 
Orthodox Romanians are Christians), which means the third religious community in Italy (Ciocca, 
2018). As discussed, Muslims also lack a specific Intesa with the Italian state. 
The Waldensian Church is fairly limited in size, with about 30,000 members. They were a pre-
Protestant denomination founded by Peter Waldo in the 12th century, until adhering to Calvinist 
theology and merging with the Methodist Evangelical Church to form the Union of Methodist 
and Waldensian Churches in 1975. They are members of the Federation of Protestant Churches 
in Italy. As mentioned above, the Waldesians’ Church is the second largest beneficiary of the 
8x1000 funds, and it organizes a wide network of services in Italy and abroad, financed by both 
8x1000 and private resources. The Synod of the Waldensian and Methodist churches established 
in 1993 that the funds received should be used entirely for welfare, social and cultural projects, 
and not at all for religious purposes, such as to finance religious and spiritual activities of the 
Church, to construct places of worship or to pay shepherds. Every year the Waldensian Table, 
the executive organ of the Synod, publishes a detailed report of the projects that have been 
financed.16 Among the main services, it is worth mentioning the diaconia. This was originally an 
establishment built next to a church for the care of the poor and the distribution of charity in 
medieval Italy; however, diaconia currently proposes a vast array of social services beyond 
charity, and they are not always located next to churches. The services proposed by the 
Waldesian diaconia include nursing homes, centres for the assistance of young and disabled 
                                                          
16 See http://www.ottopermillevaldese.org (last accessed 7 June 2019). 
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people, libraries, etc. Also, in this case, services are open to everyone, beyond their religious 
affiliation, but, relatively speaking, they are limited in size when compared with Catholic social 
services. In 2017, only 12% of the activities proposed by diaconia were supported financially by 
the Italian state through the 8x1000 system.17 A minor part of the money comes from 
entrepreneurial activities, such as the profits of a network of hotels and guesthouses given the 
name ‘Waldensian House’, but profits are limited in size, being around €400,000 per year. Most 
of the money for the running of social services comes from private donations and the economic 
status of the Waldensian community, which is mostly located in the economically flourishing 
valleys of the Piedmont region,18 mirrors the current economic status of the Waldensian Church, 
which is relatively affluent, given the limited size of the community. 
The situation is quite different in the case of Muslims. Mosques (including cultural associations, 
prayer halls and various religious sites, as previously discussed) are quite dispersed over the 
Italian territory, and disconnected from one another. The main social services provided by 
mosques in Italian cities relate to educational activities and integration in Muslim communities. 
Although these services are formally open to everybody, in fact they mostly address Muslim 
families and contribute to the dissemination of Islamic values and communities (Russo, 2018; 
interview with Imam B, Turin, 3 April 2018). The mosque often becomes a place of mediation 
between different urban realities and different senses of belonging: it is a space where support 
is offered to families living in between their own Muslim traditions, and the ‘Western’ way of 
life dominating Italian cities (Allievi, 2014). Mosques organize reading groups, school visits, trips 
for young people, lectures on the Italian constitution and citizenship, assistance for women, 
economic support for marginalized families, and the redistribution of food surpluses from 
restaurants. Non-Muslim users are rare, and the visibility of these social services to the Italian 
population is low, according to a recent ethnographic analysis (Bossi, 2019; Griera, Fabretti, & 
Giorda, 2018). The money used to run these social services comes in a minor part from the Italian 
state. Most of it comes from the Muslim community because of the zakat, a form of alms-giving, 
which is seen in Islam as a religious obligation. Zakat works as a kind of taxation system, allowing 
the redistribution of wealth within the Muslim community and the financing of collective 
services for local communities. Finally, a large amount of money comes in the form of donations 
on behalf of foreign Muslim countries such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia (cf. Zannotti, 2014). 
In the case of Romanian Orthodoxy, the distribution of resources is, to a large degree, centrally 
planned. The Romanian Diocese of Italy collects funds coming mainly from private donors, and 
then it distributes the resources to the 270 parishes, give or take, located all over Italy. Also, in 
the case of the Romanian Orthodox Church, most of the social services target members of the 
same religious group. Services include the first reception of Romanian immigrants, support for 
families in their search for home, work, linguistic mediation, economic support initiatives for 
poor students, distance adoption of Romanian children, visits to prisoners and to patients in 
hospitals, as well as economic and psychological assistance to mothers in difficulty, spiritual and 
psychological support activities, and bureaucratic–administrative assistance (Episcopia 
Ortodoxă Română Italiei, 2016). In 2012, an institution was founded for hosting ‘health tourists’, 
meaning poor people coming from Romania in order to be treated in Italian hospitals, together 
with various social and philanthropic projects to help children from Romanian and Moldovan 
families. During the Christmas period, donations are collected in order to help poor people in 
                                                          
17 See https://www.diaconiavaldese.org (last accessed 7 June 2019). 
18 It has to be stressed that the valleys have not always been affluent. This is particularly the case of Val 
Germanasca, one of the main areas for the Waldesian community, which was in the past a mining and working-class 
area. In other words, the valleys hosting the Waldesian community were marginalized areas, hosting a marginalized 
(minoritarian) religious group. For a history of Waldesians, see Vinay (1974). 
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Romania. As in the case of Muslims, the social activities proposed by the Romanian Orthodox 
address people sharing the same religious affiliation, with a transnational attitude. Italian 
resources are supposed to help not only local subjects but also their Romanian and Moldovan 
‘brothers’ and ‘sisters’. Also in this case, activities are offered to marginalized subjects belonging 
to different cultures and religions. However, the services proposed by the Romanian Orthodox 
Church address a rather homogeneous, transnational group of people. 
It has to be noted that the condition of Muslims and Romanian Orthodox Church in Italy has to 
be framed in relation to migration phenomena. Actually, these communities are mostly made 
up of immigrants who moved to Italy in recent decades. As a result, these communities present 
the needs and problems typically associated with weak, minority groups: access to local 
institutions, support for integration and inclusion in communities allowing the reproduction of 
traditional values, beliefs and knowledge, in a framework of very limited economic resources 
and huge differences between urban policies (cf. Hoekstra, 2018). The case is different for the 
Waldensian Church, since their believers are Italians in legal and cultural terms, as this religious 
group developed in northern Italian regions over centuries. Although Waldensians are limited in 
numbers, they are not marginalized subjects in terms of wealth and social integration. This 
allows a focus on self-protection and self-reproduction of religious values and religious 
communities characterizing other minority groups to be bypassed, as in the case of the Italian 
Muslims and Romanian Orthodox. As a side effect, Waldensian social services are quite popular 
among the Italian population and they receive a large share of 8x1000 funds. The ‘soft power’ 
of the Waldensians, that is, their social legitimation and credibility, is relatively high in Italy. In 
contrast, other minority religious groups struggle for legitimation, funds and visibility in Italian 
cities. 
 
 
5. Religions in action: inter-faith competition in Italian cities 
The situation described so far highlights the huge gap separating Catholicism from other groups 
in the access to resources and visibility, and in the concrete possibilities for organizing and 
running urban services for the population. In fact, 8x1000 – as well as 5x1000 for religious groups 
which are not formally recognized by the state – is a litmus test to measure the hierarchical 
relationships between religions, but also to reveal the blurred lines between the formality and 
the informality of the use of economic resources. In the case of the Christian Catholic Church, it 
is well known that taxpayers’ money is widely used in order to finance a wide religious apparatus 
of ‘worship needs’ including catechesis, ecclesiastical courts, the construction of new churches, 
the maintenance of religious buildings and, for about one-third of the total amount, for the 
sustenance of the clergy. More precisely, the money assigned to the Catholic Church in 2018 has 
been destined as follows: €355 million for the various abovementioned ‘worship needs’, €368 
million for sustaining the clergy and just €275 million for charity initiatives, both in Italy and 
abroad.19 Using a large amount of public money for non-charitable activities is somehow 
unpopular, but the hegemonic position of the Catholic Church in Italian society makes it possible 
to keep on receiving more than 80% of the money destined for religious groups. Other religions 
have similar needs, but they have much lower access to public resources. One strategy for them 
may be to enact a kind of selective camouflage in funding competition by branding themselves 
as meaningful social and cultural actors, beyond their spiritual dimension, that is, to emphasize 
                                                          
19 See https://www.8xmille.it/rendiconto (last accessed 7 June 2019). 
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the idea that money will be used for social purposes and for the public good, and not for 
exclusively religious needs. 
This may be easily perceived by looking at the advertising campaigns developed by the various 
religious groups, which, for the aims of this analysis, have been collected by exploring their 
websites. In the ads, there is no mention of the use of public funds for paying priests or for 
restoring churches (also in the case of Christian Catholic advertising), while there is a strong 
emphasis on their social activities targeting the poor and homeless and other marginalized 
people. Putting it differently, religious groups accessing the 8x1000 system mostly represent 
themselves as secondary welfare providers in order to justify their use of public resources 
(Figure 1).20 For example, the website of the Seventh Day Adventists proposes the slogan ‘100% 
projects, 0% cult expenses’ in order to stress that the entire amount of money received by Italian 
citizens will be used for social services.21 
 
Figure 1 – An 8x1000 promotional ad by the Italian Buddhist Union 
 
Note: The sentence reads ‘[Y]ou are not signing for us, but for them … people’  
Source: http://www.buddhismo.it/8x1000/ (last accessed 7 November 2019) 
 
 
                                                          
20 The images presented here have to be considered as anecdotical examples, because promotional materials have 
not been systematically collected and analysed in this research. For a specific analysis of 8×1000 promotional 
materials, see Viganò (2011). 
21 See https://www.ottopermilleavventisti.it/8permille (last accessed 7 June 2019). 
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The 2018 Christian Catholic 8x1000 campaign mobilizes the slogan ‘Ask them’ (Chiedilo a loro), 
presenting different stories concerning marginalized individuals who have had better lives and 
real-life improvements thanks to the services they offered (Figure 2).22 
 
Figure 2 – An 8x1000 promotional ad by the Christian Catholic Church 
 
Note: The title reads ‘Ask him’, while the text at bottom states: ‘Yes, ask Michele or Nun Lia, who every day provide 
food in a canteen in Padua. Ask Merhawi, who like many escaped war and famine. Or ask the ill living in Mumbai 
slums and those of courage who are caring for them. With 8x1000 to the Christian Catholic Church, you keep on 
helping a lot, for many. If you do not trust us, listen to their real stories: www.chiediloaloro.it’ 
Source: https://www.chiediloaloro.it 
                                                          
22 See https://www.8xmille.it (last accessed 7 June 2019). 
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In this framework, it has to be mentioned that the Waldensian Church is commonly perceived 
as an option: ‘Waldesians attract donations from non-Waldesians because they enjoy public 
trust’ (interview with a Waldensian pastore, 18 March 2019), and it provides, to a certain extent, 
an alternative to the hegemony of the Christian Catholic Church. Since the Christian Church has 
a dominant position in economic, cultural and social terms, and since it is well known that the 
Catholics receive by far the largest amount of public money, which is also used for cult expenses 
which are disconnected from social services (such as paying priests and building churches), part 
of the Italian population does not want its money to go to them. As a result, about 470,000 
Italians decided to destine their 8x1000 quotas to the Waldesian Church in 2018, while there are 
only about 24,000 Waldesians in Italy (Tables 1 and 2). Another possibility for people not willing 
to donate money to the Christian Catholic Church is to choose to give their 8x1000 to the state 
for secular social activities, but anti-government feelings are also quite widespread, as the Italian 
government is often perceived as bureaucratic, costly and ineffective. Religious minorities, such 
as Buddhists, are often perceived by conservative groups as ‘closed’ communities, belonging to 
‘other’ and ‘alien’ cultures, using public money for ‘their’ believers. As a result, they tend to 
attract limited resources from subjects who are external to their religious networks. Most of all, 
the entire organization of the 8x1000 system tends to disadvantage several religious minorities 
by excluding certain communities from the main mechanism for accessing resources, that is, 
8x1000. As discussed, this is the case of both Romanian Orthodox and Muslims, since they are 
not fully recognized by the Italian state as religious groups, and hence they can only access 
5x1000 funds. 
Overall, religious groups are characterized by very different regimes of visibility and invisibility 
in Italian cities. Christian Catholic-related social activities, welfare services and charity 
institutions are simply everywhere, distributed all over the Italian territory by an impressive 
network of churches, oratories, schools, hospitals, etc. After all, the presence of Catholicism in 
Italian society has been naturalized by centuries of visibility in Italian cities (Pollard, 2008). Some 
minority religions strongly embedded in local territories, such as the Waldesians, also adopt a 
regime of local visibility, being largely accepted and ‘trusted’ by local populations. On the 
contrary, various minority religions struggle to get visibility and social legitimation and, in some 
cases, they may even opt for invisibility as a strategy for avoiding stigmatization and conflicts 
with conservative parties. This is quite evident in relation to the location of mosques, partly in 
relation with their ambiguous legal status and partly because of stigmatization practices, as 
mosques are often interpreted by conservative groups as intrusive and even dangerous places 
in Italian cities (Bossi, 2019; Russo, 2018; interviews with a mosque leader, Turin, 18 June 2019). 
As a result, mosques are often located inside buildings that are supposed to host different 
activities, such as warehouses, flats and abandoned factories, and in marginal urban spaces 
(Figure 3) (see also Chiodelli & Moroni, 2017). In a similar way, the social services proposed by 
mosques, as well as those proposed by other minority religious groups, are hidden from the gaze 
of those who do not share the same religious affiliation. 
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Figure 3 – Main entrance of an informal mosque in Turin, Italy 
 
Note: Nothing suggests the presence of a place of worship inside the building 
Source: Photo by the Authors, 2018 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
The position of religious groups in Italian society is definitely intricate and uneven. Since the 
Italian state has developed various unilateral relations with different religious groups, their 
positions and possibilities to access resources and visibility are highly uneven, with the Christian 
Catholic Church having a dominant position vis-à-vis all the other groups. 
The uneven position of religious groups is evident in the access to public money through the 
mechanisms known as 8x1000 and 5x1000. The paper has shown that several religious groups 
have been partly reconfigured and re-subjectified as kinds of social entrepreneurs for the 
provision of social, cultural, personal and humanitarian services. Of course, there are several 
spiritual, ethical and moral reasons behind the active role of religious groups in supporting the 
weakest fringes of society, reasons that have not been explored in this paper. Rather, the paper 
has focused on the competitive dimension of religious groups trying to position, reposition and 
legitimate their role to the Italian population in order to obtain resources. In this framework, 
ideas of ‘competition’ and ‘competitiveness’ have to be mobilized with caution. The 
environment is de facto competitive because money flowing to one religious group will not flow 
to another. Still, it has not to be intended as a flat and even competitive field where every 
religious group is trying to erode the other groups’ quotas: several minoritarian groups are 
18 
 
simply excluded from the main form of competition, that is 8x1000, with the Romanian 
Orthodox and Muslim community being the most evident cases. Several minoritarian groups 
seem to compete on different levels and with different strategies, for example, by leveraging 
internal resources and community networks; the most evident case in point mentioned above 
is that of the Mormons, who decided not to engage in the 8x1000 mechanism. In this scenario, 
the politics of camouflage develops at different levels. First, the race for access to financial 
resources does not really look like a competition: the competitive dimension is concealed and 
mystified in order to praise and celebrate religious groups’ civic activism. The Catholic Church, 
from its dominant position, proposes positive discourses about religious diversity, ideals of 
tolerance, integration and dialogue (Griera et al., 2018). 
Second, the camouflage involves racialization processes. The ‘othering’ of religious groups 
visibly overlaps with the ‘othering’ of ethnic groups in many popular discourses and mainstream 
political narratives. For example, migrants from certain countries in Africa are commonly 
supposed to be Muslims, and Muslims are intended as those subjects coming from a certain list 
of countries, while, for example, Romanian Orthodoxy is supposed to be the proper religion for 
subjects coming from Eastern Europe. Identities are essentialized, and the way data are 
collected (i.e., presuming figures on the basis of immigrants’ country of origin, as discussed in 
note 2) reinforces this cultural construction which ultimately leaves much space for conservative 
discourses and fundamentalist positions. In fact, many discourses, mostly proposed by right-
wind parties (such as Nord, Forza Italia, Fratelli d’Italia) tend to assume that ‘defending’ and 
‘preserving’ Catholic spaces become a way of defending Italian culture, and that the spread of 
‘other’ religions has to be opposed. Therefore, all Arabs are Muslims and all Muslims are Arabs, 
and according to a local imam, in the framework of a discussion on popular stereotypes, the 
most widespread clichés concerning Muslim men is that ‘we are sexist, violent and intolerant, 
while women are subjugated and held as prisoners by their families’ (interview with an imam in 
Turin, 18 June 2019). 
In this scenario, it is not a coincidence that the second largest religious group receiving money 
is that of the Waldesians, a relatively small religious group in terms of size, which is disconnected 
from (contemporary) religious flows: there is no ethnic ‘othering’ for Waldesians, who are 
ultimately assumed to be simply ‘Italian’. Christian Orthodox are ‘closer’ than Muslims (they are 
assumed to be Romanians); therefore, opposition with respect to their spatial presence is 
weaker. This becomes evident in consideration of the other dimensions of the politics of 
camouflage which have been mentioned here, that is, spatial camouflage: many minoritarian 
religious spaces are concealed from people’s gazes, being relegated to the margins of urban 
spaces or inside buildings with apparently other uses, such as warehouses or old factories, while 
Catholic buildings seem to be everywhere in Italian cities, but they often look like secular spaces, 
such as schools and hospitals. Spatial camouflage develops in ambiguous frameworks 
hybridizing presence and absence, visibility and invisibility. 
Overall, the 8x1000 and 5x1000 competitive systems unfold within an aesthetic, discursive and 
representational regime that transforms religious competition into a form that is acceptable and 
tolerable. Urban space develops and reveals this camouflage: urban religion-based services 
produce a geography of civic–religious initiatives, which adds a meaningful layer of complexity 
to the forms and practices of factual citizenship and the structures of power operating in Italian 
cities. 
  
19 
 
References 
Allievi, S. (2014). Immigration, religious diversity and recognition of differences: The Italian way 
to multiculturalism. Identities, 21(6), 724–737. 
Angelucci, A., Bombardieri, M., & Tacchini, D. (Eds.). (2014). Islam e Integrazione in Italia. 
Venezia: Marsilio. 
Attolino, S. (2012). L’ospedale ecclesiastico: un’economia civile. Stato e Chiese. Retrieved from 
www.statoechiese.it 
Baubock, R. (2003). Reinventing urban citizenship. Citizenship Studies, 7(2), 139–160. 
Bauman, Z. (2000). Liquid modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Beaumont, J. (Ed.). (2018). The Routledge handbook of postsecularity. New York: Routledge. 
Beaumont, J., & Baker, C. (Eds.). (2011). Postsecular cities: Space, theory and practice. London: 
Continuum. 
Becci, I., Burchardt, M., & Casanova, J. (Eds.). (2013). Topographies of faith: Religion in urban 
spaces. Leiden: Brill. 
Becci, I., Burchardt, M., & Giorda, M. (2017). Religious super-diversity and spatial strategies in 
two European cities. Current Sociology, 65(1), 73–91.  
Boni, G. (2006). Chiesa e povertà: Una prospettiva giuridica. San Paolo: Cinisello Balsamo. 
Bossi, L. (2019). Le moschee: spazio della violenza o luogo della comunità? In M. Bombardieri, 
M. Giorda, & S. Hejazi (Eds.), Capire l’islam: mito o realtà? (pp. 237–264). Brescia: 
Morcelliana. 
Botti, F. (2014). Edifici di culto e loro pertinenze, consumo del territorio e spending review. Stato 
e Chiese. Retrieved from www.statoechiese.it 
Brighenti, A. (2010). Visibility in social theory and social research. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Bugg, L. B. (2012). Religion on the fringe: The representation of space and minority religious 
facilities in the rural– urban fringe of metropolitan Sydney, Australia. Australian 
Geographer, 43(3), 273–289.  
Burchardt, M., & Hönne, S. (2015). The infrastructure of diversity: Materiality and culture in 
urban space – An introduction. New Diversities, 17(2), 1–13. 
Burchardt, M., Wohlrab-Sahr, M., & Middell, M. (2015). Multiple secularities beyond the west: 
Religion and modernity in the global age. Boston: Walter de Gruyter. 
Caimi, L. (2006). Cattolici per l’educazione: studi su oratori e associazioni giovanili nell’Italia 
unita. Brescia: La scuola. Chiodelli, F. (2015). Religion and the city: A review on Muslim 
spatiality in Italian cities. Cities, 44, 19–28.  
Chiodelli, F., & Moroni, S. (2017). Planning, pluralism and religious diversity: Critically 
reconsidering the spatial regulation of mosques in Italy starting from a much debated law 
in the Lombardy region. Cities, 62, 62–70.  
Ciocca, F. (2018). Musulmani in Italia: Impatti urbani e sociali delle comunità` islamiche. Rome: 
Meltemi. 
Cloke, P., & Beaumont, J. (2013). Geographies of postsecular rapprochement in the city. Progress 
in Human Geography, 37(1), 27–51.  
Coleman, S., & Maier, K. (2013). Redeeming the city: Creating and traversing ‘London–Lagos’. 
Religion, 43, 353– 364.  
Crupi, V. (2003). Il sostentamento dei ministri di culto. Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino. 
Dwyer, C. (2016). Why does religion matter for cultural geographers? Social and Cultural 
Geography, 29(6), 1–5.  
Dwyer, C., Gilbert, D., & Shah, B. (2013). Faith and suburbia: Secularisation, modernity and the 
changing geographies of religion in London’s suburbs. Transactions of the Institute of 
British Geographers, 38(3), 403–419.  
20 
 
Episcopia Ortodoxă Română Italiei. (2016). Almanah Bisericesc, Roma, Episcopia Ortodoxă 
Română a Italiei. 
Folliero, M. C. (2010). Enti religiosi e non profit tra welfare state e welfare community: la 
transizione. Turin: Giappichelli. 
Gale, R. T. (2008). Locating religion in urban planning: Beyond ‘race’ and ethnicity? Planning 
Practice and Research, 23(1), 19–39.  
Gambini, P. (2002). L’animazione di strada. Leumann: Elledici. 
Garbin, D. (2012). Introduction: Believing in the city. Culture and Religion, 13(4), 401–404.  
Garelli, F. (2016). Piccoli atei crescono. Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Giorda, M., & Hejazi, S. (2014). Monaci senza dio: pratiche, senso, essenza. Milano: Mimesis. 
Giorgi, A. (2018). Minoranze religiose tra Europa e Laicità locale. Milano: Mimesis. 
Griera, M., Fabretti, V., & Giorda, M. (2018). Initiatives interreligieuses et gouvernance locale: 
les cas de Barcelone et de Turin. Social Compass, 65(3), 312–328.  
Hoekstra, M. S. (2018). Governing difference in the city: Urban imaginaries and the policy 
practice of migrant incorporation. Territory, Politics, Governance, 6, 362–380.  
Holloway, J., & Valins, O. (2002). Placing religion and spirituality in geography. Social & Cultural 
Geography, 3(1), 5–9.  
Hopkins, P., Long, L., & Olson, E. (Eds.). (2013). Religion and place: Landscape, politics and piety. 
Dordrecht: Springer. 
Klingorová, K., & Gökarıksel, B. (2018). ‘God was with me everywhere’: Women’s embodied 
practices and everyday experiences of sacred space in Czechia. Gender, Place & Culture, 
25(1), 37–60.  
Kong, L. (2010). Global shifts, theoretical shifts: Changing geographies of religion. Progress in 
Human Geography, 34(6), 755–776.  
Kuppinger, P. (2014). Flexible topographies: Muslim spaces in a German cityscape. Social and 
Cultural Geography, 15(2), 627–644.  
Leach, N. (2006). Camouflage. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Marchei, N. (2014). La legge regionale sull’edilizia di culto alla prova della giurisprudenza 
amministrativa. Stato e Chiese. Retrieved from www.statoechiese.it 
Milani, D. (2015). Assistenza sociale, partecipazione e riconoscimento della diversità culturale e 
religiosa. Il modello italiano. In A. Castro Jover (Ed.), Asistencia social, participacion y 
reconocimiento de la diversidad: un estudio comparado entre Alemania, España, Francia 
e Italia (pp. 117–145). Tricase: Libellula. 
Mori, M. (2011). Un oratorio per educare. Brescia: La Scuola. 
Naso, P., & Salvarani, B. (2012). Un cantiere senza progetto. L’Italia delle religioni Rapporto 2012. 
Bologna: Emi. Orsi, R. (1999). Gods of the city: Religion and the American urban landscape. 
Bloomington: Indiana University. 
Pace, E. (2013). Achilles and the tortoise: A society monopolized by Catholicism faced with an 
unexpected religious pluralism. Social Compass, 60(3), 315–331.  
Pagnoncelli, N. (2017). Un pomeriggio all’oratorio. Bologna: Dehonaiane. 
Pollard, J. (2008). Catholicism in modern Italy: Religion, society and politics since 1861. London: 
Routledge. 
Purcell, M. (2003). Citizenship and the right to the global city: Reimagining the capitalist world 
order. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 27(3), 564–590.  
Ramello, L. (2009). Cos’è l’Oratorio? La Rivista del Clero Italiano, 12, 858–875. 
Rancière, J. (2000). Le partage du sensible: esthétique et politique. Paris: La Fabrique. 
Ruez, D. (2012). ‘Partitioning the sensible’ at Park 51: Rancière, Islamophobia, and common 
politics. Antipode, 45 (1), 1128–1147.  
Russo, C. (2018). Musulmani di Roma: Spunti di riflessione da una etnografia. In A. Saggioro & C. 
Russo (Eds.), Roma città plurale (pp. 285–371). Rome: Bulzoni. 
21 
 
Sayad, A. (1999). La double absence: Des illusions de l’émigré aux souffrances de l’immigré. Paris: 
Le Seuil. 
Schmoll, C., & Semi, G. (2013). Shadow circuits: Urban spaces and mobilities across the 
Mediterranean. Identities, 20(4), 377–392.  
Secor, A. (2003). Citizenship in the city: Identity, community, and rights among women migrants 
to Istanbul. Urban Geography, 24(2), 147–168.  
Staeheli, L. (2003). Cities and citizenship. Urban Geography, 24(2), 97–102. 
Tse, J. K. H. (2014). Grounded theologies: ‘Religion’ and the ‘secular’ in human geography. 
Progress in Human Geography, 38(2), 201–220.  
Ventura, M. (2013). Italy. Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer. 
Ventura, M. (2014). Creduli e credenti: Il declino di Stato e Chiesa come questione di fede. Torino: 
Einaudi. 
Vertovec, S. (2010). Towards post-multiculturalism? Changing communities, conditions and 
contexts of diversity. International Social Science Journal, 61(199), 83–95.  
Viganò, D. E. (2011). Chiesa e pubblicità. Storia e analisi degli spot 8x1000. Soveria Mannelli: 
Rubbettino.  
Vinay, V. (1974). Storia dei valdesi. Torino: Claudiana. 
Yorgason, E., & della Dora, V. (2009). Geography, religion, and emerging paradigms: 
Problematizing the dialogue. Social & Cultural Geography, 10(6), 629–637.  
Zamagni, S., & Bruni, L. (2015). Economia civile. Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Zannotti, L. (2014). La costruzione di una moschea: l’esempio di Colle Val d’Elsa. Stato, Chiese e 
pluralismo confessionale, 33, 1–10. 
